The Reform of the UN Security Council: Flaws and Obstacles

August 29, 2016 OPINION/NEWS

Eduardo Munoz/Reuters

 

By

Durodola Tosin

INTRODUCTION

The UN Security Council was created after the most destructive war in history to help the world respond to global security threats with overwhelming force if needed.

The UN Charter, as amended in 1965, creates a fifteen-member council with the authority to impose binding decisions on all UN member states.1 It consists of five permanent members with the power to veto substantive decisions, namely, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. There are also ten non-permanent members elected by the General assembly for a staggered two years term. These non-permanent members are representative of various regions.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) remains an important source of legitimacy for international action. Yet despite dramatic changes in the global system over the past fifty years, the composition of the UNSC has remained unaltered since 1965, and there are questions and criticism on how long its legitimacy will last without additional members that reflect twenty-first-century realities.

The issue of the Security Council reform is one of the perennial debates that have been discussed for at least 20 years; some people like Sahar Okhovat even say this issue is as old as the Council itself. Due to the flaws of the UN Security Council, different debates and proposals on the reform of the Council have emerged. The Security Council’s current membership, especially in the permanent class, neither gives room for equitable regional representation nor does it project the present changing geopolitical realities.2

However, there is little agreement, as to which countries should aspire for a seat at the UN Security Council or even by what formula aspirants should be judged. Reform advocates frequently call for equal representation for various regions of the world, but local competitors like Nigeria and South Africa or Mexico and Brazil are unlikely to reach a compromise solution. Moreover, the UN Charter prescribes that regional parity should be, at most, a secondary issue; the ability to advocate and defend international peace and security should, it says, be the primary concern.3

This reform saga needs to end sooner than later and the failure to achieve the Security Council’s reform would eventually contribute to the demise of the United Nations. A divided group respond to critical issues collectively.

This paper seeks to examine the flaws of the UN Security Council, the reform proposals especially from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the two models by the UN High-Level panel and the obstacles to the reform of the UN Security Council.

 

 

FLAWS OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL

 

The United Nations Security Council, the principal organ responsible for maintaining international peace and security, has been faced with criticism since its establishment in 1946. Critics and politicians alike have criticised this Council for its small size and exclusive nature, its relations with the General Assembly, its working methods, and its undemocratic structure.

After the end of the Cold War, the Council became more efficient and more engaged in international matters and peacekeeping operations, the calls for reform paradoxically increased. One of the explanations provided in this regard is that perhaps after the end of the Cold War, the UN Member States have regained part of their lost faith in the Council and therefore started to try harder to make its structure compatible with the current realities of the world.4

The United Nations Security Council is not perfect. The fundamental flaws of this organ have led to many calls for reform from the majority of the UN Member States. The relations between the Security Council and the General Assembly are strained and it is not just because the Council is an exclusive club of fifteen members that does not necessarily act according to the best interests of the majority of the United Nations members. As Robert Hill pointed out, the fact that this club is able to pass binding resolutions whilst the resolutions of the GA (General Assembly) with 193 members are not legally binding and the belief of many UN members that the UNSC is increasingly expanding its mandate are other contributing factors to this uncomfortable relationship.5

The first and only reform of the Security Council happened in 1965 when the number of non-permanent members increased. The main reason for this reform was that the number of the UN Member States had more than double and had increased from 51 to 114. Since that reform, the number of the UN Member States has increased substantially again especially because after the fall of the Soviet Union many new members joined the UN. Today, the United Nations has 193 members. The imbalance between the number of the GA and the UNSC members has made the UNSC very exclusive and has formed one of the main flaws of this Council.

Also, the Veto power is one of the biggest flaws of the Security Council and the main factor that has rendered this body undemocratic. The most criticism has been directed at the infamous “power of veto”, namely the ability of the five permanent members of the Council (USA, Russia, France, United Kingdom, and China) to quash any non-procedural matter with their negative vote, irrespective of its level of internationals support.6

Since the establishment of the Security Council, permanent members have used their power of veto in accordance with their national interests. The use of that power rapidly distanced from the initial reason for which it was included in the UN Charter, namely preventing the UN from taking direct action against any of its principal founding members.

One can argue that after the end of the Cold War and because of the elimination of ideological divisions among the superpowers, the veto has been cast more sparingly. However, a look at the use of veto in the last two decades reveals that although being cast less often, the veto is still exercised for self-interest or the interests of allies. Between 1993 and 2011 out of a total of 24 vetoes, 14 have been used by the USA to protect Israel. (See the table below)

 

                Trend of Use of Veto Power

 

 

 

 

Date

Vetoing member

Vote (for-veto-abstain or against)

Draft Text No.

Subject

Initiated by

11 May 1993

Russia

14-1-0

S/25693

On the finances of UN operations on Cyprus

The UK

2 December

1994

Russia

13-1-1 (China abstained)

S/1994/1358

On Bosnia and Herzegovina (Transport of goods between the former Yugoslavia and Bosnia)

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Djibouti, Egypt, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Rwanda, Turkey

17 May 1995

USA

14-1-0

S/1995/394

On the Occupied Arab Territories (East Jerusalem)

Botswana, Honduras, Indonesia, Nigeria, Oman, Rwanda

10 January 1997

China

14-1-0

S/1997/18

Authorisation for 155 observers for the purpose of verification of the agreement of on the definite ceasefire in Guatemala

Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, The UK, The US, Venezuela

7 March 1997

USA

14-1-0

S/1997/199

Calling upon Israel to refrain from East Jerusalem settlement activities

France, Portugal, Sweden, The UK

Date

Vetoing member

Vote (for-veto-abstain or against)

Draft Text No.

Subject

Initiated by

21 March 1997

USA

13-1-1 (Costa Rica abstained)

S/1997/241

Demanding Israel’s immediate cession of construction at Jabal Abu Ghneim in East Jerusalem

Egypt and Qatar

25 February 1999

China

13-1-1 (Russia abstained)

S/1999/201

On the extension of UNPREDEP in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherland, Slovenia, The UK, The US

27 March 2001

USA

9-1-4 (France, Ireland, Norway, the UK abstained)

S/2001/270

On establishing a UN observer force to protect Palestinian civilians (considering report of UNSC meeting SC/7040)

Bangladesh, Colombia, Jamaica, Mali, Mauritius, Singapore, Tunisia

14 December 2001

USA

12-1-2 (Norway and the UK abstained)

S/2001/1199

On the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Palestine-controlled territory and condemning acts of terror against civilians

Egypt and Tunisia

30 June 2002

USA

13-1-1 (Bulgaria abstained)

S/2002/712

On the renewal of the UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia and the immunity of US peacekeepers from ICC jurisdiction

Bulgaria, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Russia, The UK

Date

Vetoing member

Vote (for-veto-abstain or against)

Draft Text No.

Subject

Initiated by

20 December 2002

USA

12-1-2 (Bulgaria and Cameroon abstained)

S/2002/1385

On the killing of the Israeli forces of several United Nations employees and the destruction of the World Food Programme warehouse

Syria

16 September 2003

USA

11-1-3 (Bulgaria, Germany and the UK abstained)

S/2003/891

On the Israeli decision to remove Palestinian Authority leader Yasser Arafat

Pakistan, South Africa, Sudan, Syria

14 October 2003

USA

10-1-4 (Bulgaria, Cameroon, Germany and the UK abstained)

S/2003/980

On the security wall built by Israel in the West Bank

Guinea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Syria

25 March 2004

USA

11-1-3 (Germany, Romania and the UK abstained)

S/2004/240

On the condemnation of killing of Ahmad Yassin, the leader of the Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas

Algeria and Libya

21 April 2004

Russia

14-1-0

S/2004/313

On the termination of the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and replacing it with the UN Settlement Implementation Mission in Cyprus

The UK and The US

5 October 2004

USA

11-1-3 (Germany, Romania and the UK abstained)

S/2004/783

On the demand to Israel to halt all military operations in Northern Gaza and withdrawal from the area

Algeria, Pakistan, Tunisia

Date

Vetoing member

Vote (for-veto-abstain or against)

Draft Text No.

Subject

Initiated by

13 July 2006

USA

10-1-4 (Denmark, Peru, Slovakia, the UK abstained)

S/2006/508

On the demands for the unconditional release of an Israeli soldier captured earlier as well as Israel’s immediate withdrawal from Gaza and the release of dozens of Palestinian officials detained by Israel.

Qatar

11 November 2006

USA

10-1-4 (Denmark, Japan, Slovakia, the UK abstained)

S/2006/878

On the Israeli military operation in Gaza, the Palestinian rocket fire into Israel, the call for immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Gaza strip and a cessation of violence from both parties in the conflict

Qatar

12 January 2007

Russia and China

9-2-4 (South Africa against; Congo, Indonesia and Qatar abstained)

S/2007/14

On Myanmar (Burma)

The UK and US

11 July 2008

Russia and China

9-2-4 (Libya, South Africa and Vietnam against; Indonesia abstained)

S/2008/447

Condemning the violence by the government of Zimbabwe against the civilians after the election of June 27 and demanding an immediate cease of attacks against and intimidation of opposition members and supporters

Australia, Belgium, Canada, Croatia, France, Italy, Liberia, New Zealand, Netherland, Sierra Leone, The UK, The US

Date

Vetoing member

Vote (for-veto-abstain or against)

Draft Text No.

Subject

Initiated by

15 June 2009

Russia

10-1-4(China, Libya, Uganda and Vietnam abstained)

S/2009/310

On the extension of the UN observer mission’s mandate in Georgia and Abkhazia

Austria, Croatia, France, Germany, Turkey, The UK, The US

18 February 2011

USA

14-1-0

S/2011/24

On describing the Israeli settlement in Palestinian territory occupied since 1967 “illegal” and demanding all settlement activities cease immediately

Co-sponsored by 130 countries

Country

Total number of veto used between 1991-2011

Issue

The US

14

13 regarding Israel-Palestine conflict, 1 regarding ICC

Russia

6

2 regarding Cyprus, 1 regarding Balkans, 1 regarding Georgia, 2 to support Burma and Zimbabwe (two of its allies)

China

4

2 against countries supporting Taiwan, 2 to support Burma and Zimbabwe (two of its allies)

The UK

0

——————————

France

0

——————————

SOURCE:  CPACS working paper; no. 15/1. 2011 In The United Nations Security Council: Its Veto Power and Its Reform by Sahar Okhovat (2011), P. 58-62. Accessed on 26 August, 2015.

 

Moreover, we should not overlook the influence of the “pocket veto”, so called because on many occasions permanent members managed to keep an issue off the Council agenda or soften the language of a resolution without actually casting a veto by mere threats of using that power.7 This undemocratic privilege of the permanent five combined with other flaws of the Council led to several calls for reform.

Lack of transparency of the Council, many of its working methods and to some extent its agenda have all been also criticised since its establishment and have led to strong calls for reform. Many countries are critical of the agenda of the Council because they believe the conflicts in Europe, Africa and the Middle East are more likely to appear in the agenda than the conflicts in Asia and South America. In fact, the maintenance of international peace and security is approached differently in different geographical regions.8

However, the size of the Council is not reflective of the UN’s growing membership and is at odds with the contents of Article 2 of the Charter; namely the “principle of the sovereign equality of all…Members”.9 This is why many countries are advocating for an increase in the number of the Security Council permanent and non-permanent members. The regional representation of the Council has attracted much criticism as well. The UNSC has two Western European permanent members while Africa, the second most populous continent and South America have no permanent representatives.

The last weak point of the Council to be pointed out is that the permanent members of the Council, at least in the last decade, have been five of the top ten arms exporting countries. From 2000 to 2010, together they have been responsible for 71 percent of reported conventional arms export.


Article 26 of the Charter states that:

In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources, the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments”.10

Therefore, the P5 members of the Security Council, some of the biggest arms exporters, are in charge of establishing a system of armament regulation and have to control that big trade. This conflict of interest does not allow the Security Council to fulfil its responsibility; what Jimmy Carter acknowledged and explained well in his 1976 presidential campaign, saying that “we can’t have it both ways. We can’t be both the world’s leading champion of peace and the world’s leading supplier of arms”.11

The Security Council’s structure is still largely the same as its initial structure in 1946 and does not reflect the current world power distribution and geopolitical situation. Today, most of the Permanent Five are not the most stable and most powerful countries of the world but they have kept a power which enables them to have considerable influence on the Council’s decisions, policies and agenda.

Countries are not satisfied with the speed or achievements of these negotiations. In this context, the case was made that Africa could no longer be left out.  Military prowess should no longer be the sole prerequisite for inclusion in the highest echelons of the world body.  The UN needed to be democratised, creating the need for African regional representation in the permanent membership of the Security Council.  African countries demanded two permanent seats for Africa, pointing out that a disproportionate amount of the Council’s agenda is concentrated in Africa.12

With over 50 countries in Africa, the question immediately became which two countries would represent Africa should this reform take place.  However, the African Union has not been able to come to a decision on this. A number of countries have put themselves forward, including Egypt, South Africa, Libya, Nigeria, Kenya and Senegal.

Also, the Group of Four (G4) – an alliance of Germany, Japan, India, and Brazil has started separate efforts to present a resolution on the reform of the Council to the General Assembly with the aim of securing permanent seats for each of them. Whether they can get enough support to bypass Intergovernmental Negotiations has to be seen.13

 

REFORM PROPOSALS

 

Several proposals on different categories of reform (size, veto, regional representation, categories of membership, and working methods) have been developed during the years. The proposal for the enlargement of the Security Council, either by addition of permanent or non-permanent members, has gained relative headway.

There were several proposals by various groups on the reform of the UN Security Council such as the G4 (Japan, Germany, Brazil, and India), The Non- Aligned Movement and Uniting for ConsensusA group which was founded in the 1990’s in opposition to the expansion of the Security Council permanent seats. The group objective is to counter the G4 nations’ bid for permanent seats. The group has about 40 member states. The leaders of the group are Italy, Pakistan, South Korea, Argentina, and Mexico. This group is against the expansion of the permanent seats and favours only the extension of the non permanent seats. In their draft the group proposes adding ten non-permanent members thereby expanding the Council to 25 members.

I will briefly review the proposals of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) for the reform of the UN Security Council since Nigeria as an African state supports its proposal.

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) opposed the expansion of the UN Security Council with Germany and Japan only. The group supported the entry of these states on the provision that permanent seats would also be allocated to the members of the NAM. The majority of the NAM was in favour of a balanced expansion of both the permanent and non-permanent seats of the UN Security Council. However, the group did not agree on series of issues concerning the expansion of the permanent seats like the extension of the veto right to new permanent members, and the method of selection. Thus, divided into two classes.

The first class embodied mainly Latin American and Asian states. This group supports expansion of the Council with two developed countries and three from the developing regions. The proposal is also known as the two plus three formula. Hence they agreed, like Japan and the G4 that the right of veto should not be extended to new permanent members. The General Assembly would be responsible for the selection of the new permanent members, but the criteria for selection should be deliberated by the regions.

The second class comprised mainly African States. For that reason the group acted under the African Union. The African states proposed two permanent seats and two non-permanent seats for Africa; two permanent seats and one non-permanent seat for Asia; one non-permanent seat for Eastern Europe; one permanent seat and one non-permanent seat for Latin America and the Caribbean; and one permanent seat for Western Europe.

Divergent to the first class the African states were in support of giving the veto to the new permanent members in order to avoid the creation of second-class permanent members. The African states believed that all privileges of the current five permanent members should be extended to the new permanent member states. African states supported a regional selection and the regions itself should be responsible for the selection of its representatives in the Security Council. The African states then agreed on rotational permanent seats for Africa.

In response to the various division over the reform proposal for the enlargement of the members of the UN Security Council, the United Nations set-up a panel to produce a proposal for the reform of the Security Council. The High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change produced a report in December 2004 in which they said that the Security Council decisions often “lacked realism, equity and consistency, resulting in inadequate follow-up and implementation by the UN’s membership as a whole”.14

Ironically, like the member states, the Panel also could not agree in a single formula. The Panel proposed two models: Model A and Model B.

 

Model A

Model A provides for six new permanent seats, and three new two – year term non-permanent seats, divided among the major regional areas as follows:

Regional area

No. of States

Permanent seats
(continuing)

Proposed new
permanent seats

Proposed two-year seats
(non-renewable)

Total

Africa

53

0

2

4

6

Asia and Pacific

56

1

2

3

6

Europe

47

3

1

2

6

Americas

35

1

1

4

6

Totals

model A

191

5

6

13

24

Source: UN Document in A. S. Akpotor and P. E. Agbebaku, 2010, p. 52

Proposal A recommends six additional permanent seats in the Security Council in addition to the current permanent five. It was assigned as follows; two to Africa, two to Asia, (Japan and India as prescribed), one to Europe (Germany as prescribed) and one to Latin America (Brazil as prescribed). These new six were to also possess the veto power.

 

 

Model B

Model B provides for no new permanent seats but creates a new category eight four-year renewable-term seats and one new two-year non-permanent (non-renewable) seat, divided among the major regional areas as follows:

 Regional area

No. of States

Permanent seats
(continuing)

Proposed new four-year-renewable-
term seats

Proposed two-year seats
(non-renewable)

Total

Africa

53

0

2

4

6

Asia and Pacific

56

1

2

3

6

Europe

47

3

2

1

6

Americas

35

1

2

3

6

Totals

model A

191

5

8

11

24

Source: UN Document in A. S. Akpotor and P. E. Agbebaku, 2010, p. 52

 

Proposal B recommends creating eight rotating two-year term seat (non- permanent) with the four regions above having 2 seats each.   

  

THE CRITERIA

 

To improve the Council’s credibility and capacity the Panel offered a series of four principles to guide its enlargement which it termed a necessity.15 The criteria contained in the high level panel on “Threats, Challenges and Change”16 concerning the reform of the Security Council are:

  1. They should, in honouring article 23 of the charter, increase the involvement in decision-making of those who contribute most to the United Nations financially, military and diplomatically, specifically in terms of contributions of United Nations assessed budgets, participation in mandated peace operations, contributions to voluntary activities in support of the United Nations objectives and mandates. Among developed countries, achieving or making substantial progress towards the international agreed level of 0.7 percent of GNP of ODA should be considered important criteria of contribution.

  2. They should bring into the decision – making process countries more representative of the broader membership, especially of the developing world.

  3. They should not impair the effectiveness of the Security Council.

  4. They should increase the democratic and accountable nature of the body.

 

OBSTACLES TO THE REFORM OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL

 

One can conclude that the veto power of the P5 is one of the biggest obstacles to the reform of the Security Council. Any fundamental reform, such as any changes to the number of the Security Council seats, has to be inscribed into the Charter. On the other hand, Articles 108 and 109 of the UN Charter give veto power to the P5 over any amendment to the Charter.17 Therefore, no reform can materialise without the consent of the permanent members. For example, China, as a veto holding member of the Council, is strongly against the addition of permanent members.

Consequently, the G4, as one of the most serious advocates of reform, does not have high chance in breaking the stalemate of the reform process while China is actively opposing part of its proposal. This is why Paul Kennedy, Yale University historian, calls the veto power “the Catch-22” of the Charter reform.

Articles 108 and 109 of the Charter have made the prospect of the veto reform very slim, if not impossible. It is hard to expect that veto holder countries will support any reform of the power that gives them the last say in one of the most important bodies of the United Nations. The UN Charter gives them the means to eventually block any reform proposals suggesting changes to the power of veto.18

Another serious obstacle, as may be concluded from what happened during the debates on reform, is the disagreement of countries on the details of the preferred reform proposal. The fact that countries cannot reach an agreement on the number of additional seats, the type of those seats (permanent or non-permanent), possible candidates, and the extension of veto power or its abolition, as well as the fact that each country is still advocating its own old proposal without much compromise, have proved to be big barriers against the progress of reform debates.19

The Charter provisions requiring the agreement of all P5 to any reforms proved to be a great impediment against Security Council reform. However, among those P5, the status of the United States is different. On several occasions, such as the 2003 Iraq war or recent threats of ceasing the financial support of the United Nations in the event of the GA endorsement of Palestinian statehood, the USA has proved that it has the capacity to bypass the UN and its bodies and act according to its own interests.

Thomas Weiss argues that currently Washington’s domestic and foreign policies have a considerable impact on the agenda of the Council and its actions. Considering the USA’s current impact and record, “the idea that the remaining superpower will continue to participate, politically or financially, in an institution whose purpose would be to limit its power has no precedent”. Therefore, among the P5, the USA has proved to be a bigger obstacle to the reform of the Council. It is not only unlikely to compromise, but is also capable of withdrawing from the Council or even the United Nations, if other members of the Security Council insist on reforms that are not in accordance with its interests.20

The USA might have lost some of its power, especially its economic supremacy, but it is still considered a superpower. This is not the case for some other permanent members, namely UK, France and Russia. When the Soviet Union dissolved to leave only Russia, its status and identity changed from a superpower to a country that aspired to become part of the capitalist world. Therefore, Russia does not have the same credentials as its predecessor. It is not as powerful and its economy is only half the size of the Soviet Union’s economy.21 Similarly, UK and France are no longer “great” powers.

The question here is whether these countries will be more willing to compromise. The ideas of the experts in this regard differ. By considering the current power status of these permanent members and the fact that states use any available institutions to fulfil their national interests, Thomas Weiss believes that it is very unlikely that diminishing powers like France and UK would be willing to give up any of their power or share it with new rivals. After all, being permanently on the Security Council and having veto power give them the capacity to have a louder voice than “their actual power merits”.22

Moreover, the willingness of the permanent members to support the reform which would affect their status and their power can be partly estimated from their stance towards the possible resolution that the G4 is working on. This resolution can be the most serious attempt for reform in a long time, although we have to keep in mind that this resolution is not intended to seriously jeopardise the power of the P5 as it has not called for veto reform and has been rather vague about the type of the additional seats it is asking for. Stewart M. Patrick says that UK and France, which have realised their vulnerability “as power shifts to new centres”, support this resolution.

Russia, which has traditionally been against the addition of permanent members, supported India’s bid for permanent membership in 2010. Consequently, Russia is likely to support the G4 resolution. The USA, despite supporting Japan, Brazil and India, has not done anything in that regard and its support has been mainly rhetorical.23 USA has not publicly supported the resolution which shows that when that it comes down to the action, the USA is not sure of maintaining its support for the G4 and the reform in general.

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

In conclusion, it could be said that the demand for the reform of the United Nation which would enable the expansion of the Security Council and its permanent membership is justified. This is predicated on the dynamic nature of the evolving international system that has to change in accordance to the vicissitudes of the time.

The international system has gone through such a rapid transformation to the extent that the UN Structure as it was as at the time of its establishment is making the UN not to function effectively as expected by majority of its membership. Besides, the reactionary tendencies of the five permanents members are really not helping matters. As such the argument that the Security Council membership be expended to include major financial contributors and the equitable representation of the regional spread to enjoy veto wield status or giving more powers to the general assembly for the maintenance of international peace and security is quite germane.

The reform of the UN Security Council will not be an easy task. Considering the different views of Member States on several aspects of reform, there is still a lot to be done to achieve the reform. However, in the present development of democratisation and good governance, the UN Security Council should be enlarged sooner than later.

 

REFERENCES

  1. Kara C. McDonald and Stewart M. Patrick, “UN Security Council: Enlargement and U.S. Interests”, Council on Foreign Relations: USA, December 2010, P.5.
  2. Alischa Kugel, “Reform of the Security Council – A New Approach?” Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung: Germany, September 2009, P.2.
  3. Kara C. McDonald and Stewart M. Patrick, “UN Security Council: Enlargement and U.S. Interests”, Council on Foreign Relations: USA, December 2010, Pp. 5-7.
  4. Sahar, O. “The United Nations Security Council: Its Veto Power and Its Reform” CPACS working paper: no. 15/1 (2011), P. 3
  5. Ibid 32.
  6. Ibid 3.
  7. Ibid
  8. Ibid 32.
  9. Weiss, Thomas G. “Overcoming the Security Council Reform Impasse: The Implausible versus Plausible”, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung – Occasional Papers series, 14 (January 2005), P.10.
  10. The United Nations: Charter of the United Nations, Chapter V: The Security Council, Article 26.
  11. Anup Shah, The Arms Trade is Big Business, Global Issues Website, <http://www.globalissues.org/article/74/the-arms-trade-is-big-business>, Accessed on November 19, 2015.
  12. Femi, A. “A Permanent Seat for Nigeria in the United Nations Security Council by Femi Aribisala”, This article was first published in Financial Nigeria magazine, December 2013 edition (2013), Accessed on November 19, 2015.
  13. Sahar, O. “The United Nations Security Council: Its Veto Power and Its Reform” CPACS working paper: no. 15/1 (2011), P. 4.
  14. Luck, E. C. “UN Security Council Practise and Promise”, Columbia University (2006), P. 117.
  15. Ibid
  16. UN Document, A/59/565, Secretary General Message to the General Assembly, 2005, New York: UN.
  17. The United Nations: Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VIII: Amendments, Article 108-109.
  18. Weiss, Thomas G. “Overcoming the Security Council Reform Impasse: The Implausible versus Plausible”, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung – Occasional Papers series, No 14 (January 2005), P.13.
  19. Ibid. Pp. 16-18.
  20. Ibid. Pp. 19-22.
  21. Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, P-5 Veto Outdated, created July 1999, Global Policy Forum Website (This article was originally published in Egyptian Al-Ahram Newspaper), <http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/200/41142.html>, Accessed on November 19, 2015.
  22. Weiss, Thomas G. “Overcoming the Security Council Reform Impasse: The Implausible versus Plausible”, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung – Occasional Papers series, No 14 (January 2005), P.13.
  23. Patrick, Security Council Reform in Sight? <http://blogs.cfr.org/patrick/2011/07/07/security-council-reform-in-sight/>, Accessed on November 19, 2015.

 

 

 

 

 

Durodola Tosin

Durodola Tosin is a writer and diplomat. He started writing professionally at the age of 12. He was a Columnist in Ekiti Glory Newspaper, Nigeria from 2009-2010. He was the Ekiti 2009 Winner of the PETs Competition “Poem Section”. His passion for writing was ignited by his Parents profession in Journalism.

He has written on several topics like “The Second World War and the economic situation in Africa”, “Africa and the effect of World War II”, “Neo-Colonialism: A Major obstacle to the process of nation-building in Africa”, “Nigeria’s Leadership roles in Africa“, “The Ethnic Setting in the Nigeria Area Before 1800“, “Terrorism: A New Dimension of War“, “Early African Historians’ Writings before 1945: Precursors of Modern African Historiography“, “How Apt is the Description of 1920s in America History as The Jazz Age”, “Debt Crisis: A Major Developmental Issue in the Third World Countries”.

Durodola lives in Ekiti State, Nigeria. He holds a Bachelor’s (Hons) Degree in History and International Studies. He is currently writing a book on “Nigeria’s Quest for a Permanent Seat at The UN Security Council” and “Nigeria’s Leadership roles in Africa”.
 

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